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CORPORATE IDENTITY AND GROUP DIGNITY 
KONSTANTIN TRETYAKOV

 
ABSTRACT 
Every time a decision needs to be made about corporate rights, 
the theoretical difficulties of corporate identity and personhood 
have to be overcome. In this article, I analyze these problems from 
the perspectives of moral philosophy and law, examining how the 
theories of the former inform and influence legal discourse and 
practices (including the recent cases of Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby); my main point there is that the philosophical and legal 
understandings of personhood are analytically distinct and should 
not be confused. Based on my findings, I focus upon one particular 
teaching about corporate identity—the real entity theory—and 
expand it to develop the conception of corporate dignity, which is a 
useful analytical tool explaining the jurisprudential puzzles of group 
(corporate) rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The age-old problem of group identity and personhood looms large in 
law and moral philosophy when it comes to deciding on the legal rights 
and moral status of collectives of people. The answers to the general 
questions of how collectives of individuals should be identified and 
whether they have their own personhood and interests, which may not be 
the same as those of their members, inform regulations in many areas of 
law—from peoples’ collective right to self-determination, to legal 
recognition of a compelling governmental interest distinct from the 
interest(s) of its officials, to corporate freedom of speech and exercise of 
religion.  
One might argue that this “age-old problem of group identity and 
personhood” is not a problem at all when it comes to law by virtue of a 
tool available in legal realms to resolve it—legal fiction. This instrument 
can indeed be used to regulate group personhood for the purpose of 
application of legal principles and rules, but the very usage of the specific 
legal fiction of group identities still raises a deeper question of why 
exactly it has or has not been applied in one situation or another. The 
pragmatic answer to the last question, according to which legal fictions are 
utilized for practical purposes (e.g., to decrease transactional costs), is, 
unfortunately, not always helpful, because the conception of personhood 
(individual or group) often goes deeper than pragmatic or consequentialist 
considerations. To give a rather stark example, providing adequate 
healthcare for the elderly brings about huge transactional costs,
1
 but that 
 
 
 1. See Barbara S. Klees et al., Brief Summaries of Medicare and Medicaid, Title XVIII and Title 
XIX of The Social Security Act, as of November 1, 2013, 5, available at http://cms.gov/Research-
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(hopefully) does not mean that, to reduce those costs, we could introduce a 
legal fiction that after the age of seventy a human being loses her 
personhood and corresponding rights and can therefore be involuntarily 
euthanized. Many people would deem this consequentialist justification of 
the usage of “legal fiction” as a grave violation of autonomy and/or public 
morality—which, of course, raises the question of why the same autonomy 
and morality concerns are not apparent when group personhood is dealt 
with by introducing legal fiction(s) in other situations. So even from this 
simple example it is clear that pragmatism and consequentialism alone 
cannot give an adequate explanation of using legal fictions to establish or 
deny personhood. The problem calls for more substantial analysis. 
In addition to the question of why and when legal fictions can or 
cannot be used to regulate identity and personhood, this analysis should 
resolve some other jurisprudential and related philosophical puzzles. Do 
corporations (and collectives in general) have identity and personhood of 
their own recognized by law? To what extent does the philosophical 
understanding of personhood and identity inform the debate about 
corporate (and group) rights and legal decision-making in that area, and is 
there an implicit recognition of corporate personhood when legislators or 
courts assert corporate rights? Are there any rights at all that are directly 
attributable to a collective as such and not as an assemblage of separate 
individuals? If those rights exist, what is the source of those rights? 
This Article addresses these questions through the philosophical and 
legal analysis of the problem of group identity and personhood,
2
 primarily 
drawing upon the example of corporate identity and personhood, 
illustrated with some prominent examples from the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, including the cases of Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby.
3
 To do that, I offer one observation and suggest a theoretical 
framework to deal with the puzzles of corporate identity, personhood, and 
rights. 
 
 
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/ 
MedicareMedicaidSummaries2013.pdf (last accessed Apr. 23, 2016). 
 2. For short answers to these questions, see the conclusion of this Article. It is probably 
redundant to say that in this Article I take for granted (rather than seek to prove) that such a thing as 
“identity” does exist. This philosophical assumption is largely dictated by the purpose of this work (to 
see how moral theories about identity fit and justify legal argument), since if a contrary assumption 
that there is no such thing as identity is chosen (which can be deduced, for instance, from some 
Buddhist teachings—e.g., the doctrine of “no-self” (anatta) [see, e.g., DAMIEN KEOWN, BUDDHISM 
AND BIOETHICS 28, 30 (2001)]), it will rule out one hundred percent of American law, which renders 
the whole analytical enterprise pointless. 
 3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014).  
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The observation is that the philosophical and legal discussions of 
corporate personhood are distinct and should not be conflated: the 
philosophical notion of corporate personhood does not directly determine 
the scope of corporate legal personhood. This is because moral philosophy 
concerns itself with abstract questions of what personhood is and how it 
should be determined, while the legal aspect of the same phenomenon is 
different. A legal thinker preoccupied with the problem of personhood 
should answer the question of which rights, duties, and privileges should 
or should not be attributed to a given entity. Because these philosophical 
and legal questions are distinct they require different methods to resolve 
them. 
The theoretical framework that I am suggesting is the conception of 
group (corporate) dignity―the respect for independent corporate will 
realizing basic group goods. This framework buttresses itself upon the real 
entity narrative of corporate (and, more broadly, group) identity and is a 
conceptual grounds to answer the question of which rights should and 
should not be attributable to corporations and other collective entities. The 
structure of this Article develops these basic ideas. 
Part I of the Article provides an overview of philosophical discourse on 
the problem of identity and then links it with the leading theories of 
corporate identity in law. I start with the notion of identity because it is 
conceptually broader than that of personhood (we can speak of the identity 
of anything, but personal identity is attributable to only certain beings). 
Part II discusses the narrower philosophical problem of corporate 
personhood within the identity discourse, while Part III scrutinizes the 
legal discourse of corporate personhood and provides some illustrations 
from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to support the observation 
that philosophical and legal conceptions of personhood are analytically 
(and practically) distinct. Finally, Part IV draws upon a special view on 
corporate identity—real entity theory—and expands it from the notion of 
independent corporate will to the account of group basic goods and then 
develops the larger conception of group (including corporate) dignity, 
which has important implications on group (including corporate) rights. 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/6
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I. IDENTITY IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND CORPORATE IDENTITY IN LAW 
A. Philosophical Approaches to Identity Determination 
At the most general level, “identity” means “sameness.”
4
 This 
sameness, in turn, can be understood qualitatively or numerically: 
qualitative identity is the sameness of things “shar[ing] properties,” while 
numerical identity is about absolute sameness (absolute qualitative 
identity) and “can only hold between a thing and itself.”
5
 For example, all 
watches can be said to be qualitatively identical in a sense that they all 
share certain properties allowing them to show time. (Of course, we can 
identify subcategories of watches within the broader class of qualitatively 
identical objects: e.g., we can speak of identities of sundials, mechanical 
watches, electronic watches, etc.). On the other hand (pun unintended), 
two watches can be numerically identical only if we are speaking of the 
same watch at different moments of time (e.g., now and a minute ago). 
Finally, it should be observed that being numerically identical does not 
always presuppose being qualitatively identical (and, of course, vice 
versa): if I break my watch so that it is no longer functioning, it is now 
qualitatively non-identical with the watch I had before the accident 
occurred, but it is nevertheless numerically the same watch of mine. Some 
changes in qualitative identity, however, can destroy the numerical 
identity too (e.g., suppose I deconstruct my watch into a heap of 
mechanical bits and pieces; this heap is nether qualitatively nor 
numerically identical to the watch I used to have).
6
 
Now, as far as law is concerned, it operates with both kinds of identity 
to regulate social relations. Qualitative identity is largely used when 
principles and rules are formulated (e.g., securities regulation rules are 
applied to financial instruments and corporations―that is, classes of 
things sharing certain qualities and therefore being qualitatively identical). 
 
 
 4. Harold Noonan & Ben Curtis, Identity, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Summer 2014 Edition) (Edward N. Zalta ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
sum2014/entries/identity/ (last accessed Apr. 23, 2016). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 201, 202 (1986). The borderline between 
keeping and losing numerical identity in case the qualitative identity is disrupted lies, I think, with the 
properties based on which the identity (numerical and/or qualitative) is determined. In my example 
with the watch, the property for numerical identity is its mechanical integrity, whereas the property of 
qualitative identity is its ability to show time. Needless to say, the choice of these identity-determining 
properties is subjective in that there is no method that allows choosing such properties following some 
“objective laws” pertinent to the thing or its “essence” (since doing the latter will involve using the 
concept of identity, which makes the whole reasoning circular).  
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On the other hand, numerical identity is mostly used when a given rule or 
principle is applied (e.g., a person who has committed a crime and a 
person punished for committing that crime must be numerically identical; 
or a plot of land which I have purchased to build a house and the plot of 
land where I am now building my house must be numerically identical). 
As these examples demonstrate, the concept of identity can be applied to 
animate beings, inanimate objects, and their combinations (so we can talk 
about the identity of a human being, a dog, a precious gem, a disabled 
person using prostheses, a flamboyance of flamingoes, a religious 
congregation, and a corporation). 
It is easy to see that the definition of identity as qualitative and 
numerical sameness per se does not establish how the latter is determined 
in specific cases. For the purposes of this Article, I will focus on two ways 
of determining identity: internal and external. Identity is determined 
internally when a sentient creature (call her an identifier) answers the 
questions of her personal identity (e.g., when I am asking myself whether I 
remain the same person over time, or whether certain beliefs and desires 
are truly mine and not just imposed upon me by the social environment).
7
 
By contrast, identity is determined externally when a sentient creature (call 
her a beholder) identifies other creatures or objects in a certain capacity; 
the examples of this include me identifying another person as my family 
member, or a dog identifying his owner, or a buyer in a shop identifying a 
bottle of olive oil. The identities determined internally and externally may 
not always be the same
8
: for example, while a human baby or an 
individual in a permanently vegetative state clearly can have externally 
determined identities as a family member and a recipient of certain social 
insurance benefits, there is virtually no chance that they have the same 
identities determined internally. 
Both internally and externally determined identities play a prominent 
role in the functioning of the legal enterprise. For example, a legal subject 
may identify herself and/or be identified by other people as such (e.g., I 
am identifying myself and being identified by my government as a bearer 
of a right to vote). The difference between internally and externally 
determined identities of the same subject holds in law as well. The most 
obvious example is a person being unaware of some of her rights or duties 
that she is identified with by other people (e.g., government officials). 
 
 
 7. See generally MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES (1996). 
 8. While internally determined identity is always a personal one, externally determined identity 
is not necessarily personal (compare, e.g., the identity of a bottle of oil and the identity of its buyer, 
both determined by a cashier in a supermarket). 
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Regardless of this difference, however, the identity used in law is always 
of a narrative kind: the subjects of law are always identified as such by 
reference to the narratives of legal statuses available in formal sources of 
law (e.g., a reader of this article is legally identified as a citizen of a 
certain country by referring to the legal norms about citizenship and by the 
rights, privileges, duties, and powers they entail). The law fits all the 
subjects of its regulation into a story—a narrative—of their respective 
legal statuses. 
B. Narratives of Corporate Identity in Law 
Once the existence of externally determined identity in law is 
acknowledged, it is easy to see that corporations clearly can (and do) have 
one. In Anglo-American law, three theories of corporate 
identity―narratives about externally determined corporate identity―are 
available: the artificial entity theory, the aggregation theory, and the real 
entity theory.
9
 
According to the first theory, a corporation, as famously explained by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
10
 “is an 
artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of the law. . . . [I]t 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it.” The aggregation narrative deems a corporation as “the 
aggregation of natural persons that have [legal] rights,”
11
 and as a “‘nexus’ 
or ‘web’ of contracts between free and independent individuals.”
12
 Finally, 
the real entity theory of corporate identity states that “groups are not 
explicable as the total of the individual preferences, privileges, or rights of 
each group’s members. . . . [A] corporation [is] real in a way that [is] not 
explainable as the sum of its parts.”
13
 
These three narratives are dependent upon the convictions of a 
beholder; within American legal discourse, these convictions can be 
framed in terms of categories of legal arguments (to use Duncan 
Kennedy’s terms)―morality, rights, social utility, formal administrability, 
and institutional competence―and their respective underpinnings found in 
 
 
 9. For a helpful overview of these theories, see, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens 
United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 914 et 
seq. (2011). 
 10. 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 11. Miller, supra note 9, at 928. 
 12. Id. at 928–29. 
 13. Id. at 922. 
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moral and legal thought: virtue ethics, deontological ethics, 
consequentialism, and positivism.
14
 Depending on the specific way these 
categories are balanced against each other, different narratives of corporate 
identity result.  
For example, the artificial entity theory primarily draws upon 
positivism and institutional competence, stating that “corporations could 
not exist but for the state grant or concession,”
15
 “the corporation must be 
created by legislative act,”
16
 and the “relations which are the basis of all 
corporate activity, are . . . always legal powers and immunities, never 
physical ones.”
17
 On the other hand, the aggregation theory with its 
emphasis on individuals with their deliberations, choices, and judgments 
realizing them in relations between each other under the proxy of 
corporate identity, primarily draws upon deontological ethics and its 
autonomy-based reasoning. 
Both artificial entity and aggregation narratives are supported by social 
utility and underlying it consequentialism, according to which a 
corporation is “an important merchantile device rendered necessary by a 
credit economy . . . to secure the limitation of liability to the property 
adventured,”
18
 and that “entity status mimics any number of institutional 
mechanisms that reduce transaction costs and thus facilitate commercial 
activity.”
19
 
These two narratives also find their further support from their integral 
part—the fiction theory of corporations which is based on 
consequentialism and formal administrability. As applied to the 
aggregation narrative, this theory states that “the corporate entity is 
thought of as a name or symbol which facilitates reference to a 
complicated group of relations, but adds nothing to them”
20
 and 
 
 
 14. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY 
OF EUROPEAN LAW, Volume III, Book 2, 309, 327–28. Kennedy identifies such groups as “argument-
bytes” of morality, rights, social welfare, expectations, administrability and institutional competence. 
Although Kennedy initially identified six types of argument-bytes, in his recent lectures he was 
identifying only five (excluding expectations which seem to me to be a blend of rights and morality 
types of arguments). Also, with regards to “social welfare,” “social utility” seems the better phrase 
since it is more neutral and escapes several (unnecessary) political and historical connotations. 
 15. Miller, supra note 9, at 916. 
 16. Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 294 (1928). 
 17. Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643, 652 
(1932). 
 18. Id. at 653, 654. 
 19. Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the 
Firm: Why Non-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 273, 287 (2014). 
 20. Radin, supra note 17, at 665–66. 
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“‘corporate person’ [is] merely a device to make reference convenient and 
accounting easy.”
21
 Robert Clark makes a similar argument in his seminal 
treatise, in which he states that “[t]he function of attributing powers to a 
fictional legal person is simple mechanical efficiency in the carrying out of 
legal acts.”
22
 As applied to the artificial entity narrative, fiction theory 
teaches that corporations can be deemed as “hav[ing] neither a body nor a 
will”
23
 and therefore are capable of “having” only those rights that are 
necessary for their functioning in accordance with the “original intent” of 
their incorporators.  
Generally speaking, the artificial entity and aggregation narratives are 
not mutually exclusive: it is plausible to think of a corporation as a 
legislative creation within which there exists a net of contractual 
relationships between its members. By contrast, the third narrative―the 
real entity theory
24
―offers a very different vision of corporate identity 
incompatible with the others. It teaches that when individuals comprise a 
group they “check and balance” their wills and interests within that group, 
and the resulting interest (or choice) is a new one, different from either a 
choice that any individual in that group could make on her own, or a mere 
compilation of different individual choices.
25
 This position was articulated 
by Ernst Freund, who wrote about the “corporate will” as “the product of 
mutual personal influence and of the influence of a common purpose, 
frequently also the result of compromise and submission.”
26
 From this 
example we can see how deontological ethics can be used to formulate a 
narrative of corporate identity very different from that of aggregation 
theory which emphasizes individual members and their relations with one 
another. Furthermore, the other categories of legal arguments (social 
utility, institutional competence, etc.) are also readily available to be 
organized around this deontological claim and support the real identity 
narrative.  
 
 
 21. Id. at 653. 
 22. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 19 (1986). 
 23. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
665 (1926). 
 24. Miller, supra note 9, at 921. 
 25. See generally ERNST FREUND, LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897). 
 26. Id. at 52. 
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The basic convictions standing behind the three narratives of corporate 
identity can be summarized in table form as follows: 
TABLE 1: DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON CORPORATE IDENTITY AND 
THEIR JUSTIFICATIONS
27
 
 Moral and Legal Convictions and Types of Legal Arguments 
Narratives 
Virtue Ethics 
(morality) 
Deontological 
ethics (rights) 
Consequentialism 
(social utility) 
Positivism 
(institutional 
competence) 
Consequentialism 
(formal 
administrability) 
Artificial 
entity 
The only 
corporate virtue 
is to excel at 
attaining the 
purposes 
spelled out in 
the corporate 
charter 
Corporation is a 
proxy for the 
individual 
will(s) of its 
incorporator(s) 
Corporation is a 
device to the 
goals, for 
realization of 
which it was 
created 
Corporation is 
an artificial 
entity created 
by the state and 
is capable of 
only those acts 
permitted by 
law 
Corporations 
“having” rights 
are legal fictions 
to advance the 
purposes of their 
creation 
Aggregation 
theory 
The only 
corporate virtue 
is to excel at 
attaining the 
purposes 
spelled out in 
the corporate 
charter 
Corporation is a 
contractual web 
of its members 
through which 
their wills are 
realized 
Corporation is a 
device to the 
goals of its 
members entering 
into contractual 
relations with 
each other 
Corporation is a 
contract entered 
between 
individuals and 
capable only of 
those acts 
agreed between 
them 
Corporation is a 
legal fiction used 
for the ease of 
reference to a web 
of contractual 
relations between 
individuals 
Real entity 
theory 
Corporations 
have their 
group virtues 
that cannot be 
reduced to 
individual ones 
Corporations 
have their own 
will and 
interests distinct 
from those of 
their members. 
Individual is a 
proxy to 
corporate will 
The recognition 
of corporate 
personhood 
results in more 
robust 
jurisprudence of 
rights and related 
institutions 
Rather than 
“creating” 
corporate 
personhood as a 
pure fiction, the 
law merely 
recognizes it as 
an existing 
reality 
Corporate 
personhood, like 
individual one, is 
real, and can 
entail a bundle of 
formal legal 
entitlements 
 
 
 27. The underlined text signifies the category of argument the narrative primarily draws upon. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CORPORATE IDENTITY AND GROUP DIGNITY 181 
 
 
 
 
II. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD: A PHILOSOPHER’S APPROACH 
A. Three Perspectives on Corporate Personhood 
The three narratives of corporate identity inform the discussion of 
corporate personal identity and personhood, which exists on two levels 
(related but distinct from one another): philosophical and legal. This 
section examines the philosophical discourse of corporate personhood. 
Following the three theories of corporate identity, we can discern three 
narratives about corporate personhood. The first one, pertinent to the 
artificial entity and aggregation narratives, is about complete denial of the 
personhood of corporations. According to this view, only conscientious 
beings have the capacity of being persons, and since a corporation is either 
a mere tool to advance the purposes of its incorporators created by the 
state, or a net of contractual relations between individuals, it cannot 
sensibly have personhood of its own. Max Radin famously narrates this 
story in his argument about corporations when he asserts that “nothing but 
human beings . . . are persons in the proper sense of the term.”
28
 The same 
view on corporate personhood (and its underlying narrative of corporate 
identity) can be traced in the criticisms articulated by some prominent 
authors on the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.
29
  
The artificial entity and aggregate narratives of corporate identity can 
also provide for a different view on corporate personhood. According to 
this view, “corporate personhood” exists, but only in a limited sense: what 
we refer to as corporate personhood is actually the part of individual 
personhood determined by individual membership in a corporation (or, 
more generally, within any group of people—a family, a commune, a 
nation). This position notably results in a seemingly bipolar notion of an 
individual, one “part” of whose personality embraces individual interests, 
while another “part” includes group interests, with those two groups of 
interests often contradicting one another.
30
 One way to overcome this 
 
 
 28. Radin, supra note 17, at 665. 
 29. See, e.g., David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations Aren’t People, SLATE (Jan. 
22, 2010), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/ money 
_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_people.html; Burt Neuborne, Corporations Aren’t People, THE 
NATION (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/157720/debating-citizens-
united?page=0,1. 
 30. See, e.g., Matthew J. Hornsey & Jolanda Jetten, The Individual within the Group: Balancing 
the Need to Belong with the Need to Be Different, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 248 (2004). 
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strange “moral bipolar disorder” is to employ the concept of relational 
ethics―like the Confucian one, for instance―teaching that the only way 
to properly understand individual interests is to integrate the collective 
goals into the individual’s personhood, thereby negating the contradiction 
between individual and collective. (Crudely put, under relational ethics an 
individual can fully realize herself only by absorbing the interests of other 
people with which she forms a distinct group—a family, a commune, or a 
state). The other (and probably the more familiar to the “Western” 
discourse) way to deal with the internal contradiction of interests is simply 
to assert the prevalence of one group of interests over the other (e.g., the 
individual over the group or vice versa). 
One example of this kind of moral reasoning is given in a recent essay 
where the authors assert that “shareholders [of a corporation] are the true 
source of religious exercise by the corporation”
31
 and that corporations do 
not “belong to some category of things whose interests are divorced from 
the interests of natural persons.”
32
 Bryant Smith also made this claim 
when elaborating on the “dual personality”
33
 of an individual and the 
feature of our thinking that “ignores the individual in the group function 
. . . [and] divides a single human being into different functions.”
34
 
Despite the subtle difference between the two positions on corporate 
personhood (its complete denial and its very limited “acknowledgment”), 
both of them strongly affirm the individual personhood, which, to 
paraphrase a famous metaphor, possesses a gravitational force so powerful 
that it completely strips corporations (or, more generally, groups) from 
their own personality independent of that of their members. Any theory of 
real corporate (group) personhood should therefore emancipate the 
collective from the individual―and this is precisely what the third 
narrative of corporate identity and the corresponding position on corporate 
personhood do. 
To recapitulate, the real entity narrative assumes that corporations are 
capable of formulating and advancing their own will (in the forms of 
choices and judgments) through the interaction between their members. In 
this respect, the real entity theory presupposes corporations’ personal 
identity and, consequently, their personhood. The question of how the 
latter is to be determined immediately arises, which requires us to consider 
 
 
 31. Meese & Oman, supra note 19, at 276 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 295. 
 33. Smith, supra note 16, at 291. 
 34. Id. at 286. 
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briefly its definitions in philosophical discourse and see which one (if any) 
fits corporations as collective, not individual, entities. 
B. Three Positions on Personal Identity and Personhood and Their 
Application to Corporations 
Moral philosophy knows of three major ways to determine identity 
with respect to persons
35
: biological, psychological, and narrative. Under 
the biological criterion, personal identity is defined as biological 
continuity of a living organism (for example, according to this criterion an 
embryo, a child, an adult, and a demented elder are identical to the extent 
that they represent the continuity of physiological functioning of the same 
organism).
36
 Under the psychological criterion, it is a unique 
psychological continuity (“overlapping chains of strong [psychological] 
connectedness”)
37
 that determines personal identity (so under this criterion 
an embryo, an adult, and a person suffering from severe dementia are not 
identical since there are no unique psychological connections between the 
three). Finally, the narrative criterion of identity requires an active 
unification of experiences by a “narrative ego” rendering them coherent 
and intelligible within the context of a “story that subject tells.”
38
 This last 
criterion of identity is different from the previous two in the following 
way: as opposed to biological and psychological criteria, each of which is 
trying to answer the “reidentification” question (that is, to determine 
whether a being is the same over time), the narrative criterion seeks to 
resolve the problem of self-knowledge (characterization), that is, to answer 
the question whether a certain property can be truly attributable to a 
person.
39
 
 
 
 35. See generally David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Spring 2014 Edition) (Edward N. Zalta ed.), available at http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/identity-ethics/. There is also the view of nonreductionism 
holding that identity is determined by the Cartesian ego (also referred to as “soul”), id., but since this 
view is non-falsifiable (the soul is a non-observable entity whose existence can be neither proved nor 
rejected) and cannot be consistently applied in law (a criminal might argue, for instance, that she 
should not be punished because since the moment she committed a crime her soul has changed), I do 
not focus on it in this Article.  
 36. As Eric T. Olson puts it, “What it takes for us to persist through time [i.e., what determines 
our personal identities] is what I have called biological continuity: one survives just in case one’s 
purely animal functions—metabolism, the capacity to breathe and to circulate one’s blood, and the 
like—continue.” ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY 
16 (1997). 
 37. Parfit, supra note 6, at 207. 
 38. Shoemaker, supra note 35; see also Schechtman, supra note 7, at 12. 
 39. Shoemaker, supra note 35; Marya Schehtman speaks of four such properties: “moral 
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Among these three criteria, the biological one makes the concept of 
personhood irrelevant. The proponents of this criterion do not necessarily 
have to deny that such thing as personhood exists; they are just saying that 
it is not necessary to determine personal identity, since all they need for 
that purpose is the continuous basic physiological functioning of a living 
organism,
40
 which may or may not possess personhood. (For this reason 
some proponents of the biological criterion prefer to use the term “human 
identity”
41
 rather than referring to a “personal” one). As far as 
corporations are concerned, however, the biological criterion is of no use 
to us anyway―a corporation is nothing like the Zergian Overmind from 
the fictional StarCraft universe―so even if it was helpful to define 
personhood, it still does not fit the real entity narrative and its strong 
assumption of a real corporate personality. 
This leaves us with two remaining criteria of personal 
identity―psychological and narrative―both of which build upon the 
notion of personhood. Under the psychological criterion, personhood is the 
psychological continuity consisting of unique and strong chains of 
connections (like memories, intentions, and desires), so personhood is 
personal identity. Under the narrative account, personhood is the principle 
in accordance with which individual experiences are unified into a 
coherent and intelligible whole (which is identity), so identity is based on 
personhood. (Therefore, under these two criteria it is wrong to say that 
“[p]ersonhood is a fundamental element of both personal and political 
identity.”).
42
 
The psychological account of personal identity/personhood is of no use 
to us for the same reason as the biological one: corporations are collectives 
and therefore do not possess consciousness, and this precludes them from 
having the “strong chains of connections” essential for that conception of 
personhood. Therefore, if we are willing to offer the most sympathetic 
interpretation of the real entity narrative and corporate personhood, we are 
 
 
responsibility, self-interest concern, compensation, and survival.” Schechtman, supra note 7, at 14, 80–
89. 
 40. Olson, supra note 36, at 17 (“Psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
a human animal to persist through time.”); id. at 18 (“[A] human animal has the persistence conditions 
. . . not by virtue of being a person or human body.”). 
 41. DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 8 (2005) (“Because I deny that we are 
essentially persons, I will sometimes speak of our identity or human identity, rather than personal 
identity.”) (emphasis in original). 
 42. Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 322 (2001–2002) (emphasis added). 
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left with the remaining criterion of personal identity, which is the narrative 
one. 
It is important to underscore that this criterion, along with the 
biological and psychological ones, is available not only to human beings, 
but also to other sentient creatures. For example, it is correct to state that 
dogs or birds possess a narrative personhood in that they unify the 
experiences of their lives and are therefore able to recognize their masters, 
breeds, and homes (although the unifying principles available to them are 
quite different from those available to human beings). In this regard, the 
claim that “the definitive characteristic of human beings is precisely . . . 
the ability to relate one’s past and future as a single being and to construct 
out of the multiplicity of one’s experience and expectations an individual 
personality”
43
 is dubious: humanity has no exclusive claim on narrative 
personhood. 
Furthermore, when it comes to human beings, narrative personal 
identity is available not only to individual human beings but also to their 
collectives. Recall that at the core of narrative personal identity lies the 
unifying principle―the personhood―that allows uniting experiences into 
a coherent whole. It is certainly plausible to think of this unifying principle 
as being spelled out in some foundational text of a group of people. 
(Religious congregations with their sacred texts come to mind first, but a 
corporate charter, specifically in its statement of company’s mission and 
principles of activities, can perform the same function). It is true, of 
course, that the unifying principle(s) in question will be applied by the 
members of a group (e.g., a corporation), and sometimes their 
interpretations will significantly differ; however, as I demonstrate in the 
last part of this Article, this does not falsify the narrative account of 
corporate personhood. 
Finally, when it comes to the question of how the law operates with 
respect to its subjects, the narrative view of personal identity seems like 
the most promising one. After all, as I have already mentioned, what the 
law does is attribute certain entitlements to its subjects as properly theirs, 
thereby responding (in a rather peculiar legalistic way) to the subject’s 
question of characterization. (For example, when a person enters a 
criminal case, she must characterize herself and be characterized by others 
in terms of legal entitlements attributable to her). 
 
 
 43. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 754 (1989), quoted in Scott A. 
Hartman, Privacy, Personhood, and the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(C) in Context, 120 YALE L.J. 379, 
393 (2010). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:171 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the (legal) real entity narrative, which 
must embrace the real corporate personhood in a philosophical sense, 
operates with a narrative kind of personhood. Now let us see whether this 
philosophical discussion of corporate identity and personhood determines 
the conception(s) of personhood in a legal sense, and if it does, then how 
exactly it works. 
III. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD: A LAWYER’S APPROACH 
A. The General Notion of Corporate Personhood in Law and Its 
Connection with Corporate Identity Narratives 
The legal discussion of personhood (including corporate personhood) 
should not be confused with its philosophical counterpart. As noted in the 
introduction to this Article, moral and legal thinkers answer the question 
of personhood quite differently. A philosopher would provide us with 
general deliberations upon the problem of personhood as related to 
identity―the line of reasoning described in the previous section. A lawyer 
has to decide which rights, all things considered (including but not limited 
to the philosophical underpinnings), the personhood of a given entity 
(understood as a bundle of rights and duties) should embrace. This 
distinction between philosophical and legal understandings of personhood 
becomes clear from the following examples: Imagine a lawyer reading this 
Article, who assumes that corporations are only artificial entities that 
possess no personhood in philosophical sense; that lawyer may 
nevertheless accept granting to corporate entities the limited protections of 
personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment (the same can be said about 
embryos, fetuses, animals, and plants, for example). By contrast, if a 
philosopher reading this piece assumes that a corporation is a real entity 
and therefore possesses a real personhood comparable to that of a human 
being, the assumption she makes still tells us literally nothing about the 
legal status of that corporation. Imagine observing a (supposedly) healthy 
human being on the street and attributing a narrative personhood to her; 
obviously, this is still a far cry from the specific legal (civil, political, 
economic, social, or cultural) rights she possesses. 
If a philosophical conception of corporate personhood is not 
determinative of its legal counterpart, then does moral philosophy 
determine in any way the scope of the term “person” used in legal norms? 
It certainly does. In order to determine the specific rights of a given legal 
subject, we should deduce them from different categories of legal 
argument (morality, social utility, institutional competence, etc.) and their 
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proper balancing against each other. In short, we should go back to the 
narrative of corporate identity. We should be cautious, however, not to 
overstate the matter here; the narrative about corporate identity is by no 
means the only determinant of legal corporate personhood in the legal 
equilibristics of balancing. As my further analysis of the cases before the 
Supreme Court makes clear, legal decision-makers can also take into 
account other social relations and objects of legal protection pertinent to 
the legal issues before them. (For example, one might well support the 
artificial entity theory and nevertheless protect corporate freedom of 
speech for the sake of the broader objective of protection of speech). On 
the other hand, sometimes the narrative about corporate identity is so 
strong that it possesses enough gravitational force within the decision to 
determine the argument (for example, in cases of unqualified acceptance 
of the artificial entity narrative and acknowledging only those corporate 
rights pertinent to the purposes of incorporation.) 
Among those narratives, the artificial entity and aggregation ones offer 
a limited conception of legal corporate personhood. According to these 
theories, corporations have rights only to the extent required for the 
protection of the rights of their individual members (either the rights 
necessary to carry on the incorporation purposes or the somewhat broader 
range of individual rights exercised by individuals in their association, 
e.g., the freedom of speech and/or exercise of religion).
44
 In this sense, the 
conception of legal personhood stemming from these corporate identity 
narratives is inherently instrumental: the presence of the “black hole” of 
individualism strips corporations of their own rights
45
 and concentrates the 
legal argument on legal entitlements (rights, privileges, or duties) of their 
individual members. In the next subsection I will show how this view 
largely (with one notable exception) prevails in present-day American law. 
 
 
 44. It is tempting to conclude that the aggregation narrative suggests a more robust jurisprudence 
of corporate personhood than its artificial entity counterpart, because it refers a lawyer to a broader 
conception of individual rights rather than the text of a corporate statute and the purposes of 
incorporation. This difference in the scope of individual rights protection, however, is largely 
overstated: as some commentators correctly note, there is nothing in corporate law that in principle 
precludes the inclusion into a corporate charter the rules and principles pertinent to the exercise of 
various individual rights through corporate form, in which case both artificial entity and aggregation 
narratives offer very much the same protection of corporate members’ individual rights. See generally 
Meese & Oman, supra note 19. Furthermore, the “purposes” of incorporation can be construed broadly 
or narrowly, providing for the more robust protection of individual rights in the former case. 
 45. Unless specified otherwise, I am using the term “right(s)” here in its broader sense to include 
not only rights but also privileges, immunities, powers, and other components of jural relations 
outlined by Hohfeld. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
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Also, in light of the limited conception of corporate personhood under 
the artificial entity and aggregation narratives, broad conclusions like 
“[o]nce a corporation is deemed a person for one right, reason demands an 
explanation why it is not a person for another”
46
 seem a bit too 
mechanical. These two narratives cover only certain rights and not others, 
and there is no need to demand the reasonable explanation of the 
narratives’ selectivity about certain rights. In other words, we do not 
require reason to justify an exception from the general principle of that 
narrative, because the general principle is already selective. For yet 
another example by analogy, think about children’s or animals’ rights, the 
legal narratives of which are also inherently selective: endowing them a 
right to life does not imply endowing them with a right to vote. 
By contrast, the real entity theory offers a more robust jurisprudence of 
legal corporate personhood: corporate will and, as will be demonstrated in 
Part IV, group dignity generally demand more inclusive protection than 
that granted by the narrower views on corporate personality in law. The 
legal corporate personhood here is not instrumental—it is intrinsic in a 
sense that it protects the rights of a corporation as a legal subject separate 
from its members. This account of “full corporate personhood” in law 
(corresponding to real corporate personhood in moral philosophy but not 
identical with it) should not mislead us into thinking that, once this view is 
accepted, corporations should immediately enjoy all the rights expressed 
or implied in the Federal Constitution and legislation, related precedents of 
the Supreme Court, and state law. 
On the one hand, many of the rights explicitly or implicitly embraced 
in the seminal texts of American law are strictly individual in a sense that 
the “nature” of some of these rights is simply unsuitable for corporations. 
The rights to life, marriage, and procreation are pertinent examples here. 
This “nature” of rights is not, however, determined by their historical and 
traditional understanding in American law, as it is sometimes suggested.
47
 
History and tradition are processes and are therefore subject to change. (As 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has demonstrated over and over 
again, there is first time for not exactly everything, but certainly for some 
 
 
 46. Miller, supra note 9, at 915. 
 47. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978) (“Certain 
‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 
‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.”) 
(emphasis added); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (“No such 
solicitude [to the free exercise right of religious organizations] is traditional for commercial 
organizations.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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things which were quite unthinkable a century or a couple of decades ago). 
The puzzles of suitability of certain rights to corporations (more broadly, 
groups) should be resolved instead by reference to the conception of group 
dignity which I will develop later in this Article. 
On the other hand, the understanding that corporations are different 
from individuals and, under the real entity narrative, enjoy different rights 
leads not only to shrinking the pool of available corporate entitlements in 
some areas but also to expanding it in others. Corporations (and groups) 
can have rights that none of their individuals taken separately can possess. 
The first example that comes to mind here is the right of self-
determination enjoyed by peoples and nations under the norms and 
principles of international law (whereas an individual representative of the 
same people or nation is not entitled to have the same self-determination 
right).
48
 Again, the list of these rights uniquely pertinent to groups 
(corporations, nations, or governments) should be determined by reference 
to the conception of group dignity. 
Now, with all these considerations of moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence in mind, let us turn to the legal material, drawing upon the 
examples of corporations and the conceptions of their legal personhood 
underlying the Court’s decisions
49
 in order to demonstrate a few basic 
points I have made so far. First, philosophical accounts of corporate 
personhood do not play a decisive role in forming legal accounts of 
corporate personhood. Second, when Justices decide upon the legal scope 
of corporate personhood, they do that by constructing the narratives of 
corporate identity balancing the five basic categories of legal arguments 
against each other. Third, depending on the argumentative force of a given 
 
 
 48. The collective rights (the entitlements of a collective as a whole) should be distinguished 
from the subcategory of individual rights that can only be exercised in a group (Anthony Appiah calls 
the last category the “membership rights,” see K. Anthony Appiah, Grounding Human Rights, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 112 (Michael Ignatieff et al. eds., 2001)). A classic example from 
the latter subcategory is a right to strike: it normally cannot be exercised by a single employee (if 
that’s the case, an employee is violating labor laws) and requires a group of workers each of which is 
exercising her individual labor right. Within the context of this dichotomy (collective rights and 
individual rights that can be exercised only collectively), an interesting question arises with regard to 
affirmative action (to the extent that it is recognized as a legal entitlement at all)—i.e., whether it 
exists as a collective right (in which case only a minority as a whole has a privilege of reverse 
discrimination, and no individual who belongs to that minority can claim the same right for herself) or 
as an individual one (in which case a member of minority can bring suits to defend her individual 
right). Depending on the answer to this question (which is determined by balancing of different 
categories of legal arguments in a given legal discourse), regulations will differ. 
 49. I will confine the examples to those from federal constitutional law, but the legal material to 
illustrate the points made earlier can also be taken from state constitutional law or from federal and 
state regulations in other areas of law. 
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narrative of corporate identity, different legal conceptions of corporate 
personhood will follow, resulting in either broader or narrower protections 
of corporate rights. 
B. Corporate Personhood in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence 
The jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court is a fertile area of 
law to analyze legal decision-making’s moral underpinnings, since the 
opinions of the Members of the Court often reveal their legal and moral 
convictions. Of course, the moral views of the Justices about corporate 
identity and personhood have not been decisive to the outcomes of the 
cases analyzed below: after all, the Members of the Court are not moral 
philosophers who pass their decisions based on purely philosophical 
considerations—they are lawyers operating within the boundaries of legal 
principles and rules. Nevertheless, examining selected Court opinions in 
light of the narratives of corporate identity and the related conceptions of 
corporate personhood reveals certain assumptions shared by the Justices, 
which are important in understanding the thrust of Court’s doctrines’ 
development in that area and help to draw a more accurate picture of legal 
argument. 
The seminal decision of the Court that defined the corporation
50
 is 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
51
 Chief Justice Marshall 
found a corporation to be “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.”
52
 The Chief Justice was apparently 
endorsing the concession theory of the corporation, according to which it 
“possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence,”
53
 balancing 
it with the purpose-based arguments when he added that “[the properties 
of a corporation] are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the 
object for which it was created.”
54
 Chief Justice Marshall also noted along 
the lines of formal administrability that corporations can “hold property 
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, or 
perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to 
hand.”
55
 
 
 
 50. See 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4 (rev. ed. 2010). 
 51. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 52. Id. at 636. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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The Chief Justice also observed that corporations are established and 
exist so that “a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting 
for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.”
56
 This 
signals, I think, the Chief Justice’s underlying deontological view on 
corporations—precisely, that a corporation per se has no autonomy, 
whereas the individuals constituting the corporation do. 
As the analysis makes clear, the Court’s Dartmouth opinion endorsed 
the artificial entity (corporation is an “artificial being”) and aggregation 
(corporation as an embodiment of a “perpetual succession of individuals”) 
narratives of corporations and the view on corporate personhood according 
to which there is no such thing as real corporate personality. To reach this 
result, the Chief Justice balanced all five categories of legal argument in 
his reasoning: morality (purpose-based corporate virtue), rights (denial of 
corporate autonomy), social utility (consequentialist appraisal of corporate 
goals as “beneficial to the country”
57
), institutional competence 
(governmental power to establish corporations), and formal 
administrability (convenience of property management). For Chief Justice 
Marshall, the central argument, with which he harmonized the other four, 
was probably that of institutional competence and the concession theory 
arising from it. The implicit rejection of real corporate personhood in a 
philosophical sense, however, did not preclude the Court from finding 
certain corporate rights grounded in formal administrability and social 
welfare considerations (e.g., to manage corporate affairs and to own 
property), thereby endorsing the conception of instrumental legal 
corporate personhood.  
Another seminal decision of the Court is Santa Clara County v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company,
58
 where at the oral argument 
Chief Justice Waite notably declared the assumption that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to corporations as 
persons.
59
 It is important to underscore that the Chief Justice most 
probably used the term “person” and the conception of personhood in a 
strongly legalistic way. The Santa Clara Court seems to have been 
focusing on corporate property, and therefore treated corporate 
personhood as instrumental to bring corporations and their assets within 
 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819). 
 58. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 59. Id. at 396. 
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the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 60
 In referring to corporations as 
“persons” Chief Justice Waite still employed the conception of 
instrumental corporate personhood, which was largely based on 
consequentialist considerations of social utility and formal 
administrability. True, the Court’s moral reasoning had changed—from 
the emphasis on institutional competence in Dartmouth to formal 
administrability and social utility in Santa Clara—but in both cases the 
Court’s opinions were still a far cry from the recognition of corporate 
autonomy, independent will, and dignity in any real sense (that is, 
detached from corporate managers and/or shareholders). 
This line of reasoning about corporate identity and personhood was 
further developed in the case of First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,
61
 in which the Court spoke of the political speech of for-profit 
corporations unrelated to the purpose of their creation and business 
functioning.
62
 Despite the majority’s characterization of the concession 
theory, according to which “corporations, as creatures of the State, have 
only those rights granted to them by the State,” as being “extreme,”
63
 the 
Court still adhered to the artificial entity narrative of corporate identity, as 
seen in the reasoning of the author of the majority opinion—Justice 
Powell. 
First of all, Justice Powell noted that the question before the Court in 
Bellotti was not “whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights.” 
Instead, he focused on the issue of abridgment of expression.
64
 Second, 
Justice Powell also observed that “certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . 
are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 
‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the 
protection of individuals.”
65
 This implicit characterization of 
constitutional protections available to group entities as non-personal is 
telling of the Court’s unwillingness to extend the conception of real 
 
 
 60. Cf. Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of The Business Corporation in American Law, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1463–64 (1987). 
 61. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 62. The analysis of this and some of the subsequent decisions of the Court is somewhat blurred 
by the usage of the conception of personhood in legal and philosophical senses by some of the 
Justices. 
 63. 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
 64. Id. at 776 (“The proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First 
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the 
question must be whether [the state law prohibiting corporate spendings intended to influence the vote] 
abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”). 
 65. 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978). 
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personhood to cover corporations. Also, although the “nature, history and 
purpose of the particular constitutional provision”
66
 test suggested by 
Justice Powell, with its focus on the norms of the Constitution, is more 
protective of corporate rights than that articulated in Dartmouth and 
repeated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Bellotti (a corporation has 
only those rights that “the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence”),
67
 it still does not suggest 
that this more robust protection is based on a recognition of corporations 
as real entities and their real personhoods. By contrast, it finds its 
justification in the Court’s concerns about the marketplace of ideas and 
speech vindicated by the First Amendment and the rights of shareholders 
and corporate management. 
With regard to the latter, when Justice Powell discussed corporations as 
speakers, he wrote about “communication by corporate members.”
68
 
Furthermore, when he analyzed the governmental interest in protection of 
minority shareholders, he framed it as “the interest in protecting the rights 
of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by 
management on behalf of the corporation.”
69
 This understanding of 
corporate speech as that of managers and shareholders
70
 affirms the 
prevalence of individual personhood over the corporate one, denies the 
conception of corporate personality analogous to that of human beings, 
and speaks of the artificial entity narrative of corporate identity offering 
limited constitutional protection to corporate “rights” as proxies of the 
individual entitlements. 
Interestingly, Justice White in his dissenting opinion also wrote that an 
“association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a means of 
achieving effective self-expression,”
71
 thereby sharing Justice Powell’s 
view of corporations as instruments to pursue individual goals. He also 
completely detached corporate managers and shareholders from the 
corporation when he asserted that “corporate expenditures designed to 
further political causes lack the connection with individual self-
expression”
72
 and that “corporate shareholders, employees, and customers 
. . . would remain perfectly free to communicate any ideas which could be 
 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 822. 
  68. Id. at 782 n.18. 
 69. Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
 70. But see id. at 777 (“[T]he speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.”). 
 71. Id. at 805. 
 72. Id. at 807. 
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conveyed by means of corporate form.”
73
 In other words, for Justice White 
the “corporate expression” is simply about “corporate management . . . 
using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with 
the corporate business,”
74
 and these positions, being “the purely personal 
views of the management, individually or as a group,”
75
 do not even 
suggest the existence of a “corporate personhood” as part of corporate 
managers’ personalities. This complete rejection of corporate personhood 
in the philosophical sense was also shared by then-Justice Rehnquist, who 
in his dissent argued in favor of the purpose-based concession theory of 
corporations based on the Dartmouth test.
76
 
The position of the majority and two dissenters in Bellotti reveals an 
interesting split within the Court. Although all the Justices seem to have 
shared the artificial entity narrative of corporate identity, the selectivity of 
specific rights protectable under this narrative led them to reach different 
results when it came to the precise definition of legal corporate 
personhood (that is, deciding which specific entitlements are protected and 
which are not). On the one hand, for Justice Powell and the majority, the 
“competing” concerns about the protection of speech and the marketplace 
of ideas overrode the artificial entity narrative, resulting in effectively 
granting a freedom of speech to corporations. On the other hand, Justice 
White did not see any threat in limiting corporate speech, and Justice 
Rehnquist limited his analysis to the precedent-based inquiry of whether 
freedom of speech “might be considered necessarily incidental to the 
business of a commercial corporation.”
77
 These considerations did not 
compete with the artificial entity narrative at all—quite to the contrary, 
they supported it, resulting in the more limited conception of corporate 
legal personhood of the two dissenters in Bellotti. 
Justice Rehnquist further elaborated upon his conception of corporate 
identity in his dissenting opinion in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 
v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
78
 where he wrote that “to 
ascribe to such artificial entities [as corporations] an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ 
for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”
79
 
Justice Rehnquist also dismissed the argument based on the notion of 
 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 803. 
 75. Id. at 813. 
 76. Id. at 823–24. 
 77. Id. at 825. 
 78. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 79. Id. at 33. 
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corporate autonomy since a public utility corporation “was largely 
surrendered to extensive regulatory authority when it was granted legal 
monopoly status.”
80
 Finally, he observed that corporate speech is purely 
instrumental to serve the marketplace of ideas,
81
 and called “treating 
[individuals, newspaper publishers, and corporations] identically for 
constitutional purposes” a “jurisprudential sin.”
82
 All these assertions 
about corporations made by Justice Rehnquist convey his approval of the 
artificial entity narrative about corporate identity. 
By contrast, Justice Powell, writing for the plurality of the Court in the 
Pacific Gas case, observed the similarity between corporations and 
individuals on several occasions.
83
 Regrettably, he did not elaborate 
further on this similarity, so it is uncertain whether, eight years after 
Bellotti, his views had changed from the artificial to the real entity 
theory.
84
 
The landmark decision of the Court in which an “ideological clash” 
over different conceptions of corporate identity and personhood was most 
apparent was the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,
85
 where Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Stevens and other 
Members of the Court joining their respective opinions demonstrated 
different approaches to conceptualizing corporate identity and personhood. 
The reasoning offered by Justice Kennedy writing for the majority of 
the Court
86
 included a number of important arguments about corporate 
identity and personhood that reflect the real entity narrative of corporate 
 
 
 80. Id. at 34. 
 81. Id. at 33 (“[C]orporate free speech rights . . . are recognized as an instrumental means of 
furthering the First Amendment purpose of fostering a broad forum of information to facilitate self-
government.”). 
 82. Id. at 35. 
 83. See, e.g., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“Corporations and other associations, like individuals, 
contribute to the [discussion] that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”) (emphasis added); see also 
id. at 16 (“For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what 
not to say.”) (emphasis added). 
 84. Interestingly (and somewhat puzzlingly), Justice Powell adopted the approach of Justice 
Rehnquist discussed earlier when he wrote for the Court in the case of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corporation of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), where he observed that corporations’ “very existence 
and attributes are a product of state law.” Id. at 89. See also Mark, supra note 60, at 1442 n.3. This 
inconsistency demonstrates either the fluctuating character of views of some of the Court Members on 
corporate personhood, or that when drafting their opinions they did not pay much attention to the 
philosophical conception of corporate personhood, focusing instead on an analytically distinct question 
of corporate rights. 
 85. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 86. In parts of his opinion pertinent to the discussion of corporate identity and personhood, 
Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
196 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:171 
 
 
 
 
identity, according to which corporations have their own personality 
independent of their members. First of all, the language of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion strongly suggests the similarities between corporations 
and individuals when it comes to speech: he asserted that “corporations 
and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the [discussion] that 
the First Amendment seeks to foster,”
87
 and he observed that 
“[c]orporations, like individuals, do not have monolithic views.”
88
 
Notably, Justice Kennedy also found that the Court had rejected the view 
articulated by Justice Rehnquist that corporate speech should be treated 
differently than that of natural persons because corporations were not the 
same as individuals.
89
 
The similarity between corporations and individuals found by Justice 
Kennedy is further supported by his factual assertions about “corporations 
. . . presenting both facts and opinions to the public”
90
 and the “voices” of 
entities, including corporations.
91
 In other words, according to Justice 
Kennedy’s account, the views expressed by corporations may not be 
monolithic, but what is monolithic are corporations—not their managers, 
shareholders, or customers—as speakers. The opinion of Justice Kennedy, 
vociferously declaring corporations as speakers independent of their 
members, strongly suggests the existence of a corporate personhood with 
its own ideas, beliefs, and values that make the very act of corporate 
speech possible. From the perspective of balancing different legal 
arguments, the focal point of Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to be the 
deontological category of rights—corporations are independent subjects 
with rights and interests distinguishable from those of their members. 
Other arguments are balanced against it: corporations can excel in their 
speech and message to the public (virtue ethics/morality), which should be 
supported by law, because otherwise the abridgement of speech will harm 
speech and the marketplace of ideas (consequentialism/social utility). 
Accordingly, corporate freedom of speech exists not as a legal fiction for 
the convenience of protecting individual speakers (formal administrability) 
 
 
 87. 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 
475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). 
 88. Id. at 364. 
 89. Id. at 343 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or 
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”). 
 90. Id. at 355. 
 91. Id. at 339, 354. 
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and as such must be recognized (as opposed to being merely “invented”) 
by the government (institutional competence). 
This conception of corporate narrative personhood was fiercely 
rejected by Justice Stevens and, interestingly, it was not supported in full 
by the three members of the Court who concurred in the result—Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. So the conception of real corporate personhood 
implicit in the Court’s opinion was not actually shared by the majority; to 
the contrary, if the split between the majority and concurrences can be of 
any guidance here, it was shared only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy. 
Justice Scalia’s approach to corporate personhood can be distilled from 
his contention about group speech, which in his view is only an extension 
of an “individual person’s right to speak . . . in association with other 
individual persons.”
92
 For example, Justice Scalia described the speech 
of political parties as “the speech of many individual Americans.”
93
 He 
also noted that a “spokesman of a corporation is a human being, who 
speaks on behalf of the human beings who have formed that 
association.”
94
 This, I believe, is indicative of Justice Scalia’s (and of two 
other Justices who joined him) view of corporate personhood as either 
non-existent (which is hard to square with the underlying assumptions of 
the opinion of Justice Kennedy in which Justice Scalia joined),
95
 or as 
existent as a product of the individual personalities of members of a 
corporation. This, together with Justice Scalia’s veneration of originalism, 
speaks of the traditional artificial entity narrative of corporate identity 
shared by him and other Members of the Court who joined his 
concurrence. 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia shared this (probably half-consciously 
articulated) conception of corporate personhood and corporate identity 
with Justice Stevens (and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor who 
joined the dissent) who, among all the authors of opinions in Citizens 
United, expressed his position on corporate personality in the clearest and 
least ambiguous way. In particular, Justice Stevens described corporations 
as “not actually members of [American society],”
96
 as entities “different 
 
 
 92. Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). 
 93. Id. at 391. 
 94. Id. at 392 n.7. 
 95. Id. at 316. 
 96. Id. at 394. 
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from human beings”
97
 and having “no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, 
no thoughts, no desires.”
98
 He also observed that “corporate ‘personhood’ 
often serves as a useful legal fiction”
99
 and he spoke of “flesh-and-blood 
persons” as “actual”
100
 and found corporations to be “not real people.”
101
 
In response to Justice Kennedy’s strong assumption of the real entity 
narrative, Justice Stevens asked the important question of “‘who’ is even 
speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that 
endorses or attacks a particular candidate.”
102
 Notably, when answering 
this question, Justice Stevens himself rejected the answers pointing to a 
corporation’s customers, employers, shareholders, officers, directors, and 
“[s]ome individuals associated with the corporation [who] make the 
decision to place the ad.”
103
 If we assume that corporate speech does exist 
(be it a university’s statement about affirmative action programs or a 
corporation’s press release after an environmental accident), then the 
plausible answer to the question seems to be that it is the corporation itself 
that speaks through the proxy of its spokesperson—but this, of course, is 
plainly at odds with what Justice Stevens asserted about corporations as a 
matter of their “basic descriptive features.”
104
 
The argument forcefully advanced in the Citizens United dissent is 
indicative of the artificial entity narrative shared by Justice Stevens, and 
his approach to corporate personhood, under which no real corporate 
personality exists. The dissenting Justices clearly endorsed the biological 
criterion of personal identity (“flesh-and-blood persons”) which falsifies 
the whole narrative about the reality of corporate personhood, and 
supports only a fictional form of corporate personality. Needless to say, 
this moral argument could not have been further from the one underlying 
the opinion of Justice Kennedy. 
Interestingly, from the perspective of the corporate identity narrative 
and its relation to the legal conception of corporate personhood the split of 
the Court in Citizens United is very much the same and yet very different 
from that in Bellotti. The similarity is that once again the opinions in both 
cases demonstrated the analytical distinctiveness of the moral and legal 
 
 
 97. Id. at 465. 
 98. Id. at 466. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 467. 
 101. Id. at 473. 
 102. Id. at 467. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 465 n.72. 
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aspects of the problem of corporate personhood. While in Citizens United 
both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens shared the artificial entity narrative 
of corporate identity, they took radically different positions on whether 
freedom of speech followed from it, resembling the back-and-forth 
between Justices Powell and White in Bellotti. The difference is that 
while Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy demonstrated their 
approval of a real entity narrative very different from the narrative to 
which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito subscribed, the five right-leaning 
Members of the Court reached the same opinion that legal corporate 
personhood is broad enough to include freedom of speech. 
This division among the Justices with respect to corporate identity 
narratives has again played out in an interesting way in the most recent 
case where the problem of corporate legal personhood loomed—Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby.
105
 In that case, much as in Bellotti, all Justices 
(possibly with an exception of Justice Kennedy) seemed to have agreed on 
the artificial entity narrative, thereby abandoning the real entity “promise” 
of Citizens United, but again the majority and the dissenters split along 
the lines of specific visions of corporate legal personhood—the right of 
business corporations to exercise religion. 
The majority’s opinion in Hobby Lobby was written by Justice Alito, 
who had joined the concurrence in Citizens United affirming the artificial 
entity narrative, so it was no surprise that his opinion presented a defense 
of that theory of corporate identity. For example, Justice Alito found 
inclusion of corporations under the term “person” to be a mere legal 
fiction to protect individuals;
106
 he also pointed out that corporations 
“cannot do anything at all” apart and separate from their members;
107
 
finally, he forcefully argued that it is the owners and managers of closely 
held corporations—not corporations themselves—whose religious beliefs 
are being violated.
108
 
This complete denial of corporate personhood in philosophical sense 
was not even disputed in a brief concurrence penned by Justice Kennedy, 
where he also focused on individuals “exercis[ing] their religious beliefs 
within the context of their closely held, for-profit corporations.”
109
 Notice 
the change of vocabulary: the corporations are no longer entities (not even 
 
 
 105. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 106. Id. at 2768. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2775. 
 109. Id. at 2785 (emphasis added). 
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to speak of their personhood)—their identity is that of “contexts” within 
which individuals realize their freedoms. This identification of 
corporations as kind of a background against which individuals live their 
lives is hard to fit with any of the three corporate identity narratives in 
American law; the closest one would probably be aggregation theory, if it 
is the “context” of various social relations that Justice Kennedy had in 
mind. 
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg—the dissenter in Hobby Lobby—also 
embraced the artificial entity narrative of corporate identity when she 
referred to corporations as “artificial legal entities” and cited the famous 
lines of the Dartmouth College opinion about beings “invisible, 
intangible.”
110
 Logically speaking, under this theory the characteristic of 
artificiality should be shared by all organizations, for-profit and non-profit 
ones, including religious organizations. Justice Ginsburg, however, 
distinguished between the latter ones and business corporations based on 
another powerful narrative in American legal discourse—the one about 
individual rights and freedoms. In particular, she explained that the 
Court’s “solicitude” (that is, the extension of First Amendment protections 
of free exercise of religion) for religion-based organizations is traditional 
because “furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often 
furthers individual religious freedom as well.”
111
 This concern about 
individual religious views, in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, overrides the 
general artificial entity narrative about organizations. In the case of for-
profit corporations, however, there is nothing, Justice Ginsburg believes, 
to counter that corporate identity narrative stemming from the Dartmouth 
College opinion: while “religious organizations exist to serve a 
community of believers,” “[f]or-profit corporations do not fit that bill,”
112
 
since they are communities “embracing persons of diverse beliefs.”
113
 
Both Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg in their Hobby Lobby 
opinions speak within the framework of the artificial entity narrative. This 
 
 
 110. Id. at 2794. Notably, Justices Breyer and Kagan did not join the dissent as to part III-C-1 of 
it, where Justice Ginsburg explains her views on corporate identity and personhood. This “split” 
between the dissenters in Hobby Lobby does not, however, seem to be indicative of Breyer and 
Kagan’s divergent view on the problem of corporate personhood—as both Justices have explained in 
their short separate dissenting opinion, the reason why they did not join Justice Ginsburg as to part III-
C-1 is that they “need not and do not decide whether either for-profit corporations or their owners may 
bring claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.” Id. at 2806. 
 111. Id. at 2794 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 112. Id. at 2796. 
 113. Id. 
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striking unity of their views on corporate identity, however, does not mean 
a unity of results from their analysis of the legal conception of 
personhood. Where Justice Alito found uniformity of business owners’ 
religious beliefs and, to protect the exercise of those beliefs, used the 
“legal fiction” attributing the right of religious exercise to corporations as 
proxies of individual autonomy, Justice Ginsburg found a diversity of 
religious beliefs of workers and saw the “legal fiction” of attributing 
religious freedom to corporations as a dangerous tool not protecting but 
restricting the autonomy of employees and their dependents by inhibiting 
their access to contraception coverage. 
Like the other cases analyzed in this subsection, Hobby Lobby also 
demonstrates that Justices consult with the corporate identity narratives 
they share when making legal decisions, balancing them against other 
factors determining their ultimate views on legal personhood (specific 
rights) of corporations. What almost all of this jurisprudence also shows is 
that artificial entity and aggregation narratives are “weak” in terms of 
protecting corporate rights, since both of them presuppose that corporate 
rights can only be legal fictions to protect the “real” rights of individual 
members, and legal fictions are open to much legal compromise in favor 
of individual rights and their desired social effects. By contrast, the real 
entity theory of corporate identity cannot be balanced against other legal 
factors so easily—instead, it can itself become one of the gravitational 
points of legal reasoning, as the case of Citizens United proves, therefore 
demanding compelling reasons to override it. This last narrative along 
with its theory of real corporate personhood, however, has been the subject 
of wide condemnation in the literature—in my view, quite undeservedly. 
In the next and final part of this Article I defend and develop the real 
entity narrative and explore the conception of group dignity arising from 
it. 
IV. FROM CORPORATE IDENTITY TO CORPORATE DIGNITY 
A. The Real Entity Narrative and Its Implications for Group Dignity 
As I have already mentioned, every narrative about corporate identity 
(and, generally speaking, every other narrative in law) can be disentangled 
from the perspective of five categories of legal arguments and their 
underpinnings in moral philosophy and legal theory. As I have also 
mentioned, the real entity theory of corporations primarily draws upon 
deontological ethics and its autonomy teachings, and it crystallizes in law 
in the form of legal arguments about rights, around which the other four 
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categories of arguments are then balanced. In particular, the real entity 
narrative teaches that when individuals come together the will of their 
collective can be distinct from the will of any of its separate members or a 
“sum” of their wills. Simply put, when we come together, our choices, 
deliberations and judgments are not merely summed up—they are being 
argued, counterargued, and coordinated against each other, transforming 
into choices and judgments that individually none of us has. The most 
obvious example is probably that of military service: none of us in sober 
mind wants to kill and/or be killed, but yet in a state of war this is 
precisely what the society and the state can demand from us. 
Another example familiar to everyone who has studied American 
constitutional law is that of “compelling governmental interest.” The 
federal government can correctly be described as “a vast bureaucratic 
edifice, comprising hundreds of agencies and thousands of offices”
114
—
and millions of employees.
115
 This huge collective of individuals, 
according to the vast jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, as a whole 
possesses a “compelling interest,” which is often at odds with the rights 
and liberties claims of individual citizens and the interests of individual 
governmental officials, and the advancement of which is the seminal 
purpose of governance. It is quite implausible, I think, to suggest that this 
interest is only a legal fiction invented by lawyers. Taxation and public 
health, for example, are quite real goals that the government pursues in its 
daily activities, and it is also quite implausible to suppose that the 
judiciary of this country has for centuries been limiting rights and liberties 
of legal subjects for the sake of a legal fiction. 
The acknowledgment of a compelling governmental interest, however, 
immediately poses the question of whom this interest belongs to. Clearly 
not always individual officials. For instance, in the Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Windsor
116
 the individual high-ranking officials of the 
federal government refused to defend the statute enacted by the 
Congress.
117
 This testifies to the fact that individual members of a group 
can (and do) have their own interests distinct from those of the collective 
they belong to, and vice versa. Answering the question of “who has 
 
 
 114. LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 213 (2014). 
 115. Historical Federal Workforce Tables, in FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT REPORTS, available at 
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/ 
historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/. 
 116. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 117. Id. at 2683. 
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compelling governmental interest” is in this sense similar to answering the 
Justice Stevens’s puzzle of “‘who’ is even speaking” when corporate 
speech occurs.
118
  
The only plausible response to these two questions lies with identifying 
a collective—the government or the corporation—with a bearer of an 
interest or a speaker, where a member of that collective (articulating and 
defending the interest or speaking on behalf of a corporation) acts as its 
proxy (and not the other way around, as strongly suggested by Justice 
Alito in his opinion in Hobby Lobby). This response also implies a real 
group personhood of a narrative kind—that is, the existence of a narrative 
principle according to which a collective organizes itself, formulates its 
ideas and interests, and continues to exist (the Federal Constitution, the 
Bible, and a corporate charter are examples). Needless to say, since under 
the real entity theory groups are different from individuals, the narrative 
principles of those groups are different from individual ones, both 
procedurally and substantively. 
The procedural differences between the narrative personhood of 
individuals and groups are as follows. First, unlike individuals, whose 
narrative of personality is often “hidden” in the debris of one’s 
consciousness, a group’s personality narrative is out there in a formal 
source open for reference of the group’s members. Second, the narrative 
principles of group personhood are less stable than those of individuals. A 
given group can change its narratives, sometimes quite dramatically (think 
of a collective of the same employees living under different corporate 
charters or a government functioning after its constitution has been 
amended). A group narrative is also open to interpretation and 
reinterpretation by members of that group and outsiders—that is, several 
interpretations can exist within the same narrative principle of a group 
(think of originalism and the living constitution theories of the 
Constitution). 
In addition to these procedural differences between individual and 
group narrative personhood, there are also substantive ones, which flow 
not so much from deontological ethics and its teaching about group 
autonomy but from virtue ethics and its theory of basic goods. The 
teaching of the new natural law school of thought that all individuals share 
a certain set of basic goods, excelling in which leads to their flourishing 
and human fulfillment, can be extended to collectives of individuals, 
 
 
 118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 467. 
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resulting in the notion of group basic goods.
119
 The detailed description of 
those goods could well take a whole separate article, so here I will just 
sketch their basics. 
A group basic good is a quality pertinent to a collective as a whole and 
excelling in which is essential to its existence and flourishing. The first 
category is institutional group basic goods, such as administration 
structures, norms, and sanctions; the second category is ideological goods, 
such as ideological stability―the continuity of a group’s interests uniting 
its members around a certain ideological message; the third category is 
membership goods, that is, the attraction of new members to the group, 
replacing the ones who have left and keeping the number of members 
administrable. Generally speaking, a fruitful methodology of describing 
group basic goods could be to draw from socio-anthropological literature 
on seminal characteristics of certain social groups and then reformulate 
those characteristics in the language of group basic goods. 
These procedural and substantive differences should not lead to the 
denial of a group narrative personhood, for the mere fact that it is different 
from that of individual humans does not mean that it cannot exist. 
Furthermore, the two-component group narrative personhood (independent 
collective will aimed at the realization of group basic goods) is a useful 
analytical tool in answering some of the jurisprudential puzzles. First, it 
does answer the “‘who’ is even speaking” question of Justice Stevens in 
Citizens United. Second, and probably more importantly, it gives an idea 
of which rights spelled out in the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence are appropriate for collective legal subjects and which are 
not by referring a legal decision-maker to group basic goods. The 
tradition-and-history-based test, suggested by Justices Powell and 
Ginsburg in Bellotti and Hobby Lobby respectively, is not always helpful 
for this purpose. As I have already mentioned, legal traditions and history 
do change, and the Justices of the Supreme Court probably know this 
better than anyone else. The group basic goods test (as a part of the real 
identity narrative), in contrast, gives us a conceptual ground to stand on 
when deciding which rights are pertinent to collective legal entities and 
 
 
 119. The group basic goods should not be confused with the notion of “common good” (as 
developed by new natural law theorists): while the former is about the goods of a collective as a whole, 
the latter is “the factor or set of factors . . . which, as considerations is someone’s practical reasoning, 
would make sense of or give reasons for that individual’s collaboration with others, and would 
likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their collaboration with each other and with that 
individual.” JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154 (2d ed. 2011) (emphasis 
added).) It is easy to see that the definition of common good given by the famed new natural law 
scholar is about individual interests as “considerations of practical reasoning.” Id. 
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which are not. The freedoms of speech and of exercise of religion, for 
example, pass this test as group rights since they square nicely with 
ideological group basic goods. The right to corporate privacy, understood, 
as some commentators suggest, as a right to maintain a certain identity,
120
 
also fits that category of group basic goods.
121
 On the other hand, a right 
to life and a right to procreation are clearly out of the scope of group basic 
goods and therefore should not be granted to collective legal entities as a 
matter of the real entity narrative (but may be granted once it is overridden 
by other legal factors in a given case). 
The two-component group personhood as a part of a real entity 
narrative also provides a foundation to the conception of group dignity—
that is, respect for corporate will and a collective’s development of certain 
basic group goods—which comports with the general message that “not all 
dignity is human dignity.”
122
 Group dignity, once conceptualized and 
accepted (more on this in the next section), can serve a basis for 
recognition of group entitlements and serve as a powerful counter-balance 
to their abridgment, thereby resulting in a more robust jurisprudence of 
collective rights. 
B. Defense of the Real Entity Narrative 
The real entity narrative of corporate identity with its underlying 
twofold conception of corporate/group narrative personhood and the idea 
of group dignity may seem utterly implausible to many readers. By far, 
most legal and political thinkers have been quite skeptical about it, so it is 
appropriate to address some of the most frequent and powerful critiques in 
 
 
 120. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 114, at 223. 
 121. Notably, when the question concerning the privacy of corporations came before the Supreme 
Court, it has unanimously (in the opinion by Chief Justice Roberts) acknowledged that “[the] case 
[did] not call upon [the Court] to pass on the scope of a corporation's ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of 
constitutional or common law.” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011). Although the Chief 
Justice might not be sympathetic to the conception of privacy as a collective entitlement (notice the 
term “privacy” used in scare quotes), I still believe it is important that the Court in that case did not 
shut the door on the development of corporate privacy jurisprudence and did not, at the moral level, 
treat privacy as “uniquely human good,” as some commentators have (mistakenly) suggested. See, e.g., 
Scott A. Hartman, Privacy, Personhood, and the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(C) in Context, 120 YALE 
L.J. 379, 393 (2010). 
 122. MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 1 (2012) (emphasis in original). See 
also Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY 
AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 409, 410 
(2008) (acknowledging that “there are different types of dignity, in each case the word refers to a 
property or properties different ones in different circumstances—that cause one to excel, and thus elicit 
or merit respect from others.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
206 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:171 
 
 
 
 
order to prove the conceptual viability of the two components of the 
narrative. 
1. Defending Real Corporate and Group Personhood 
Many critics have focused on the real corporate personhood in its 
philosophical sense as an integral part of real entity narrative, so let me 
first respond to some of the main objections to it. Once it is plausible that 
groups have a personhood of their own, the whole real entity narrative 
might start sounding much more persuasive. 
The first objection to the philosophical conception of real corporate 
personhood that has often been articulated in critical literature boils down 
to the fact that corporations are artificial entities created by law and exist 
only within a given legal framework, and therefore cannot be “persons” in 
any “real” sense of that word.
123
 This objection is inaccurate for several 
reasons. 
First of all, the artificial status of an entity does not necessarily mean 
that the entity does not and cannot possess personhood. A clone of a 
sentient being (be it a sheep or a species of Homo sapiens) is artificial in 
the sense of being “born” as a result of processes that do not naturally 
occur in Mother Nature; this artificiality, however, does not mean that 
clones have no personhood.
124
  
Second, if by “artificial” we mean “something created by law,” the 
objection still does not hold. The President of the United States, for 
example, is a purely artificial entity in this legalistic sense. Had it not been 
for the Federal Constitution, there would be no such thing as the President; 
the same can be said, of course, about Congress or the Supreme Court.
125
 
 
 
 123. I underscore again that this objection is philosophical rather than legal. It is totally 
appropriate to consider an entity a “person” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for instance, as a matter of legal fiction while completely denying 
the real personhood of that entity (this approach can apply to individuals in a permanent vegetative 
state, animals, and plants, to name just a few examples). 
 124. I would not venture to engage here in a theological dispute about whether clones of human 
beings have the Cartesian “soul”―primarily because the existence of a soul is unfalsifiable and cannot 
therefore be a proper subject of an academic discussion. 
 125. With respect to the Supreme Court, some scholars have expressed the view that in order “[t]o 
understand what the [Supreme] Court has done in the past and is likely to do in the future” it should be 
treated as “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’.” See, e.g., RICHARD FALLON, THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE xii (2d ed. 2013). I believe this 
line of analysis of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is compatible with what I have said about the 
collective will: to understand it, we should take into account individual viewpoints and see how they 
interact with each other, being argued and counter-argued, and how the compromise (the “Opinion of 
the Court”) is then reached. That being said, it is quite wrong, I believe, to treat the resulting collective 
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However, the President of the United States does have personality—and 
usually quite an outstanding one. To this, one could respond that it is not 
the President qua President who has personhood. Rather, it is the natural 
person holding the office of the President who has. The obvious 
implication from this line of reasoning, however, is that behind a 
corporation there also stands a very real group of people, and the account 
of “artificiality-in-law” does not explain why a natural person standing 
behind a legal institution can have a real personhood, whereas a real group 
cannot—after all, both individual and group as conceptualized in law are 
capable only of actions specified in law (explicitly or implicitly). 
Another objection to group personhood and the real entity narrative 
holds that groups (including corporations) do not and cannot have 
personhood because they are not human beings. This “flesh-and-blood” 
account of personality, familiar from the dissent in Citizens United, bases 
itself upon the biological or psychological accounts of personal identity—
and fails for precisely that reason. 
First of all, as I already mentioned, the biological account of personal 
identity is simply indifferent to personhood—it does not deny it, but states 
that it is not necessary to identify a living organism with itself at different 
moments of time. Therefore, arguing that only people can be “persons” 
just because they are living creatures is, to say the least, strange from 
philosophical perspective. 
Second, even if we somehow manage to use the biological criterion of 
personal identity to establish that only “flesh-and-blood” organisms have a 
claim on personhood, the questions associated with this account will still 
persist, and the most prominent one is as follows. If all we rely on to 
determine identity is biological continuity of a living organism, which in 
turn depends upon the organism’s basic physiological functioning 
(breathing, blood circulation, etc.), then where should we draw the line 
between “normal functioning” (where the biological continuity is intact) 
and “abnormal functioning” (where the biological continuity is lost)? This 
question is pertinent not only with regard to illnesses, accidents, and 
resulting disabilities that might lead to the loss of one personhood and 
 
 
will of the Court (or, for that purpose, any collective body) as a mere proxy of an individual will of a 
given Justice—that view would inevitably undermine the Court’s legitimacy and the very purpose of 
its functioning. In other words, the Court (or any other collective) is “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’” when its will 
is being formulated, but it becomes “an ‘it,’ not a ‘they’” when that will has been formulated and is 
being enforced. When Justice Alito writes the opinion of the Court in the Hobby Lobby case, it is 
Justice Alito who acts as the proxy of the Court’s (collective) will, and not the other way around (it is 
the concurring and dissenting opinions that reflect the individual interests, concerns, and wills of 
certain Justices). 
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creation of a different one, but also with regard to physiological 
enhancements (from using hi-tech prostheses to walk or participate in the 
Paralympics, to subjecting an individual to high doses of hormones to treat 
infertility, to putting a patient on a ventilator to support her breathing 
function). The biological criterion of identity does not tell us where to 
draw these lines between different levels of basic physiological 
functioning (and it is doubtful that clear lines can be drawn at all), and 
therefore fails to inform us when exactly an individual is (or is not) 
identical to her past and future “self.” 
As far as the psychological criterion is concerned, it is both over- and 
underinclusive for legal purposes. First, the unique psychological 
connection, which is seminal to determination of personhood there, can 
(and very often does) include individuals, which we commonly refer to as 
“others.” For example, I have a unique and strong psychological 
connection with some of my family members, but that does not mean that 
I share my personhood with my dear aunt (to be honest, that would take a 
heroic intellectual effort even to imagine). At the same time, the criterion 
is underinclusive for practical purposes: imagine me committing a murder 
and then having a brain trauma that causes amnesia so that I completely 
forgot what I did before the accident. Under the psychological criterion, a 
person before amnesia and after amnesia are not personally identical (the 
personhoods are different) because the unique strong connection between 
them is disrupted. But does that mean that after trauma I (I?) still should 
not be liable for what I (I?) did before? To many people, including legal 
scholars and judges, the discontinuity of psychological identity is not 
sufficient reason to exonerate an offender.
126
 Arguing that we could 
simply assume here for the purpose of regulation that the two persons are 
(fictitiously) the same still begs the question of what makes this situation 
so special that the psychological criterion must be abandoned in this 
instance. And the answer to this last question lies with the narrative theory 
of externally determined personal identity, which is widely used in law 
and which happily accords with the account of group personal identity, as 
I have explained previously. Groups do not have to have “consciences, 
beliefs, feelings, thoughts and desires” to possess personhood—all they 
need to have are principles unifying their experiences into coherent wholes 
available for interpretation by their members. 
 
 
 126. See generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Criminal Law and Multiple Personality 
Disorder: The Vexing Problems of Personhood and Responsibility, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 277 
(2001).  
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This last conclusion seems to support yet another objection to real 
group personhood—this one of a reductionist kind—which holds that the 
interests and actions of any group always boil down to those of its 
members. The objections seems to buttress the argument of Justice Alito 
in Hobby Lobby (corporations are incapable of doing anything unless 
their members do something) and finds its support from individualism in 
moral philosophy, an example of which is found in Leonard Wayne 
Sumner’s argument that “collectivities have no interests to be promoted 
beyond those of individuals.”
127
 
As far as actions are concerned, the correct factual claim of Justice 
Alito about the performer of an action (always an individual or individuals 
and never a corporation) can be explained in two ways: (1) a corporation is 
only a proxy for individuals and their choices, deliberations, and 
judgments, so an individual is the only real actor with personhood; or 
(2) an individual is a proxy for a corporation and its collective will, and 
the group is as real an actor and has as real a personhood as an individual 
is and does. The first interpretation supports the artificial entity and 
aggregation narratives, while the second one supports the real entity theory 
of corporate identity. The first interpretation seems to prevail in the cases 
where, for example, a dictator uses the government as a means to his ends; 
the second one prevails where a judge enforces a law she personally deems 
utterly unfair for the sake of the collective good of “social justice.” Both 
interpretations are possible, and the only reasons why law should 
categorically rule out the second one seems to be those of traditional 
distaste toward collectivism and fear of group (corporate) power. But 
those are reasons based in the realm of consequentialism, and they are 
different in kind from the initial deontological objection. This change of 
argument from deontology to utility testifies to the implausibility of the 
reductionist objection which cannot stand on its own but has to ultimately 
rely upon the consequentialist ally. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert the 
absence of corporate personhood in its philosophical sense based on a 
factual claim that is open to different interpretations. 
With respect to collective and individual interests and beliefs, I have 
already touched upon this point when discussing corporate will. A couple 
of additional points: First, every viable group or society has to reproduce 
itself not only in “tangible” form (that is, economically, politically, and 
legally) but also in “intangible” terms of shared beliefs and ideologies; this 
ideological-goods-based interest is uniquely pertinent to collectives and 
 
 
 127. L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 180 (1999). 
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not to individuals (the same holds for the institutional-goods-based interest 
in administration). Second, these interests are not necessarily contradictory 
to individual ones—for instance, the interest in public administration and 
the interest in procreation are not opposite, they are just different. Third, 
group and individual interests are mutually dependent and derivative: the 
collective ones arise from coordination of individual wills, while the 
individual ones are formulated within the context of a social environment 
with its collective values in which an individual is brought up.
128
 
Finally, there is one other implicit objection to the real entity narrative 
and its account of real group personhood: Some people are afraid that 
those are some “metaphysical” substances as opposed to familiar and 
traditional understandings of identity and personhood attributable to 
human beings. In response to that, first of all, I am not sure what is wrong 
with a certain substance being of metaphysical nature (that is, being 
“beyond physics” and attributable to ideal—including moral—realms), 
especially when it comes to such an inherently ideal substance as 
personality. Second, if the word “metaphysical” is used here not in its 
classical meaning but as synonymous with “fanciful” or “illusory,” then 
the account of narrative group personhood and the real entity theory of 
corporate identity are not unfalsifiable like teachings about souls of human 
beings―to the contrary, they conceptualize processes that happen in the 
real world, ready for measurement and analysis by an impartial observer. 
 2. Defending Group Dignity 
There are two main reasons why many people find the conception of 
group dignity (respect for the autonomous collective will realizing and 
excelling is group basic goods) implausible. The first one is a general 
skepticism about the very notion of dignity. According to this view, 
dignity is only “the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed 
moralists”
129
 that bears no actual meaning of its own and is at best just a 
paraphrase of the principle of respect for autonomy. The second 
skepticism about group dignity is narrower and goes like this: even if we 
assume that such thing as dignity does exist, it has traditionally been 
 
 
 128. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Groups, ACTA JURIDICA 66, 82 (2008) (“To see 
[group values] as simply instrumental to [individual values], may neglect all the ways in which 
individual values may be partially constituted by group values.”). 
 129. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE BASIS OF MORALITY (A.B. Bullock trans., 2005), quoted in 
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. OF 
INT’L L. 655, 656 (2008). 
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closely bound to individuals, so we can speak of human dignity, but not 
the dignity of collectives. 
As far as the first (more general) skepticism about dignity goes, it 
should be noted that the authors who have expressed it in the past were 
largely concerned with the conception of human (individual) dignity. For 
example, Schopenhauer penned the famous line cited in the previous 
paragraph with respect to the “expression of ‘human dignity.’”
130
 
Similarly, Ruth Macklin criticized the concept of individual dignity as 
applied in medical ethics in her 2003 editorial,
131
 and Steven Pinker was 
referring to personal dignity when he asked, “[s]o, is dignity a useless 
concept?” And he then described it as a “phenomenon of human 
perception.”
132
 It is this concentration on human dignity that has led many 
prominent thinkers (certainly Macklin and Pinker) into reductionism, 
boiling down the conception of dignity to that of autonomy. Therefore, 
strictly speaking, none of these criticisms directly applies to the 
conception of group dignity. 
The general skepticism about dignity, however, can be extended 
toward group dignity. It could be stated, for example, that what “group 
dignity” is really all about is the notion of respect for independent 
corporate will; this would bring us to the familiar grounds of deontological 
ethics and its emphasis on autonomy, and the whole “dignity” terminology 
would appear to be redundant. The obvious response to this line of 
“criticism by analogy” is that group dignity is not reducible to the notion 
of respect for collective will/autonomy, since it also involves group basic 
goods that are different from autonomy and not wholly derivative from it. 
It is true that the institutions, the membership, and the ideology of a 
particular group may be considered the products of its collective 
autonomy: after all, it is the collective will that formulates and adopts the 
corporate charters, provides for the institutions and the sanctions for not 
following them, and defines who can be the members of a given group. 
But at the same time these relations between group autonomy and 
group basic goods are not a one-way street. One could equally well argue 
that it is the corporate will that originates with group members centered 
around a certain ideological message within the framework of existing 
group institutions and norms (so that it is group autonomy that is 
 
 
 130. Id. at 661. 
 131. Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept: It Means No More Than Respect for Persons or 
Their Autonomy, 327 BRITISH MED. J. No. 7429 (Dec. 20–27, 2003), 1419. 
 132. Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/the-stupidity-dignity. 
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derivative from the group basic goods). This mutual influence of the two 
components of the real entity narrative demonstrates their 
incommensurability and the importance of paying close attention to both 
of them; missing one element by reducing it to another one will result in a 
narrative that lacks explanatory force. 
Some people also say along the lines of the first objection that the 
concept of group dignity (even if we assume for the sake of argument that 
it does exist) is just too vague and indefinite a concept to be of any use. 
The proponents of this view teach that the word “dignity” can be (and has 
been) used to signify almost anything—from a certain rank of an 
individual or institution in society,
133
 to an “inner transcendental kernel of 
inalienable value,”
134
 to not “being reduced for a moment to a passive 
object,”
135
 to many other things. Steven Pinker, for example, argues that 
“dignity is relative” and its “ascriptions . . . vary radically with the time, 
place, and beholder.”
136
 
As with any other concept, “dignity” can embrace a number of 
meanings, some of which may fall quite apart from each other; the same 
can be said about every other term used in moral philosophy and law. 
Steven Pinker, for example, suggests employing the concept of autonomy 
instead of dignity—but the former is, of course, no less “relative” than the 
latter, open to various interpretations and misinterpretations. So if one 
were to rule out the concept of dignity (individual or group) based on its 
relativity, one would need to exclude from legal and philosophical 
vocabulary such terms as “order,” “right,” “autonomy,” “freedom,” and 
dozens of other general concepts. 
The more fruitful approach lies not with categorically excluding some 
terms but with ascribing specific meanings to them. In this respect, once 
group dignity is understood as the respect for collective will realizing 
certain basic group goods, the vagueness of the concept largely dissipates. 
(Of course, there remains some uncertainty due to the high level of 
generality of the concept, but this uncertainty is tolerable in light of the 
same property of other basic moral and legal terms). 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715(1999) (“The States thus retain . . . the dignity, 
though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”); id. at 802 (discussing the “royal dignity”). 
 134. ROSEN, supra note 122, at 70. 
 135. Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, in HUMAN 
DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 409, 
410 (2008). 
 136. Pinker, supra note 132. 
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The second—and more nuanced—skepticism about dignity would 
affirm human (individual) dignity but still reject the group (collective) 
one. This view is expressed, for example, by Michael Ignatieff, who writes 
that “[t]here seems no way around the individuality of dignity, however 
socially defined it may be.”
137
 Jeremy Waldron also describes this position 
(without necessarily committing himself to it) when he writes that “the 
sense of dignity we apply to groups may not be a foundational sense,”
138
 
because once we accept that the sole purpose of a group’s existence is to 
“contribut[e] to the well-being and rights of its individual members . . . 
then the dignity of the group is bound to be derivative, not inherent.”
139
 
Finally, an intriguing view on the problem of individual and group dignity 
is presented by Joseph Raz, who, on the one hand, describes the position 
holding that “collective goods have instrumental value only”
140
 as that of 
“individualistic morality”
141
 and criticizes it. On the other hand, within the 
framework of my analysis, Raz’s position can itself be classified as 
“individualistic,” since it assumes individuals are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the collective goods
142
 and draws the justification for 
collective rights from the interests of individuals.
143
 
To my mind, this concept of exclusively-human dignity depends upon 
two premises, each of which is not convincing. The first premise is that 
any collective is only a sum of its individual members and can therefore be 
adequately explained in terms of those members (their interests and 
preferences), and we therefore do not need the concept of “group dignity,” 
which is necessarily parasitic upon the “real” human dignity. In light of 
what I have already said, this line of argument seems quite extraordinary: 
collectives are systems and, just like any other system, they cannot be 
correctly explained in terms of their parts only; any adequate 
understanding of how a system works should embrace the principles of 
interaction between its elements (e.g., mutual coordination and 
 
 
 137. Michael Ignatieff, Dignity and Agency, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 161, 
166 (Michael Ignatieff et al. ed., 2001). Notably, Ignatieff also forcefully argues in favor of the 
traditional view that personal identity can be that of individuals only and that group rights boil down to 
individual subjects exercising them, which probably reflects his implicit denial of the real entity 
narrative. Id. at 166, 168. 
 138. Waldron, supra note 128, at 75. 
 139. Id. 
 140. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 198 (1986). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 198–99. 
 143. Id. at 208. 
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compromise) and the resulting product (e.g., collective will), which are 
different in kind from their isolated counterparts. 
The second premise upon which the “service-account of group 
dignity”
144
 is based says that collectives exist only to the extent they 
adequately serve their individual members. As I have already mentioned, 
this is a virtue-ethics-based view that can be found within the artificial 
entity and aggregation narratives of corporate law, but this is clearly not 
the only plausible view of collectives and their basic goods and goals. 
Another view, which seems the more realistic to me, teaches instead that 
collectives do not necessarily exist to serve the interests of their individual 
members (think about compelling governmental interests in taxation, 
military service, and public health, which often go at odds with individual 
claims of the members of a given society). At a certain point of a 
collective’s life cycle its ideology and institutions start to prevail over the 
individual interests of its members (hence the fears about the totalitarian 
rule of the collective over an individual—but this, again, is a 
consequentialist, not a virtue-based objection). 
All this, of course, does not mean that the real entity theory with its 
conception of group dignity is one hundred percent unproblematic—quite 
to the contrary, it faces some serious methodological and substantive 
challenges. These challenges, however, are not fatal flaws in its 
construction: instead, they are rather stimuli for its further development. In 
the last section I briefly turn to these issues. 
C. The Challenges to the Real Entity Narrative 
The real entity narrative inherits one of its methodological problems 
from its virtue-ethics-based component of group basic goods. To remind 
the reader, basic goods are defined in virtue ethics in an axiomatic way—
that is, they are presented as given, as “self-evident first principles of 
practical reasoning [which] are not inferred from prior theoretical 
principles.”
145
 In this respect, virtue ethics requires from its proponent a 
certain quantum of moral faith in those basic goods as “self-evident . . . 
and indemonstrable.”
146
 Now, many people might find this axiomatic, 
 
 
 144. Waldron, supra note 128, at 76 (emphasis omitted). 
 145. ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 13 n.15 
(1993). See also FINNIS, supra note 119, at 64 et seq. I draw upon the new natural law theory here, 
which, albeit not being representative of the whole school of virtue ethics, nevertheless shares with its 
other representatives (e.g., Catholic social thought) the idea of basic human goods being revealed (or 
given to us not as a result of logical reasoning from some more basic premises). 
 146. GEORGE, supra note 145, at 12. 
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faith-based approach in basic goods, to put it mildly, not exactly 
convincing—and may understandably be quite suspicious about the 
account of group basic goods. 
This distrust of the moral axioms of group and corporate identity, 
however, can be largely dispelled by two considerations. On the one hand, 
generally speaking, all moral theories ultimately rely on axioms 
(unfalsifiable moral intuitions) of some sorts; the difference between those 
theories lies rather in the kinds of axioms they use, not in the fact that one 
theory takes some contentions as undisputable while the others don’t. 
Deontological ethics, for instance, asserts (rather than seeks to prove) that 
autonomy belongs to the list of basic goods—a point fiercely rejected by 
virtue ethics; consequentialism, in turn, also relies on some moral 
assumptions it draws from deontological and virtue ethics to make a 
second-order judgment of whether given consequences are good or bad 
and then, based on that, makes a first-order judgment about moral 
permissibility of an action producing those consequences.
147
 Finally, 
moral skepticism also requires a good deal of moral faith: making self-
contradictory assertions that there are either no moral truths in this world 
or that we are unable to find them (I believe that there are no moral truths, 
but I nevertheless think that this second-level moral judgment about moral 
truths is correct) strongly resembles the famous credo quia absurdum. In 
this regard, the virtue ethics of group basic goods is hardly an outlier in the 
realms of moral philosophy, and if a reader is skeptical about it, her 
skepticism should consistently extend to other moral theories as well. 
Furthermore, the account of group basic goods is not as axiomatic as 
that of individual basic goods. As I suggested earlier, one way to 
formulate basic goods is to take knowledge from social sciences (such as 
sociology and anthropology) and reformulate its main theses in terms of 
group basic goods (e.g., if sociology teaches us that every viable social 
group must have its structure, this can be translated into the language of 
institutional group basic goods). If this methodology proves itself sound 
(which I believe it will), then the group basic goods cease to be “self-
evident and indemonstrable”—quite to the contrary, they will become 
falsifiable and measurable. 
The second challenge that emerges with the real entity narrative is not 
about the theory itself but about the social and legal consequences it might 
produce. The most obvious concern it can raise is about the relation 
between individual human dignity and group dignity. As I have already 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 127, at 200 et seq. 
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stated, the real entity narrative is a “strong” one in legal discourse in that it 
possesses its own gravitational force that is not easily overridden by 
traditional concerns of individual rights. If this narrative and the concept 
of group dignity become law, they will inevitably collide with individual 
rights and dignity. A pertinent example here would be the problem of 
dignity of religious institutions in relation to individual human dignity,
148
 
which loomed in the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,
149
 where the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
interests of religious groups to determine their membership (membership 
group basic goods) prevail over the interests in enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws. If the logic of this example extends to non-religious 
collectives (such as corporations), then there might be cases (as Justice 
Ginsburg warned in her dissent in Hobby Lobby) where group dignity 
and rights can prevail over their individual counterparts. While some 
people might be fearful of this consequence of real entity theory, I believe 
it’s only fair to introduce it to legal discourse so that legal decision-makers 
have a more complete picture of competing legal ideals when passing their 
judgments. 
The third challenge to the acceptance of the real entity narrative and, 
more specifically, its conception of corporate dignity might seem too 
extraordinary to be persuasive to many people. Once the real entity 
narrative establishes itself within law, it would require some radical 
changes—a shift from attempts to fit individual entitlements reflected in 
the Bill of Rights to corporations, to rethinking the rights jurisprudence as 
properly reflecting the entitlements uniquely pertinent to collectives (such 
as corporations and religious congregations). One obvious response to this 
last challenge is “time will tell,” but I believe that the change is probably 
not going to be so revolutionary. For example, a collective right of peoples 
and nations to self-determination is already in American law by virtue of 
the Charter of the United Nations that has been ratified by the United 
States and has become, pursuant to Article VI of the Federal Constitution, 
“the supreme Law of the Land.” Also, American constitutional law has 
developed in the direction of broader recognition of rights both 
quantitatively (more individual rights) and qualitatively (more rights to 
 
 
 148. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dignity, History, and Religious-Group Rights, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 273 (2013). 
 149. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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more subjects), and the real entity narrative of group identity clearly falls 
within that trend. 
CONCLUSION 
In the introduction to this Article I wrote that it was motivated by five 
questions about corporations and groups, their identity and personhood, 
their rights and dignity. In conclusion, here are the answers: 
1. What is the basis of using legal fictions with respect to corporate 
personhood? It lies with the corporate identity narrative, as well as 
other factors a lawyer can consider when addressing the problem 
before her. According to some narratives, corporate personhood is 
only a fiction used to protect individual rights; those narratives are 
weak in that they can be overridden by other considerations. There 
is also the other narrative, which states that corporate personhood is 
not fictitious at all. 
2. Do corporations (and collectives in general) have an identity and 
personhood of their own recognized by law? Corporations clearly 
have an externally determined identity within legal realms, and 
three narratives of this identity are available: artificial entity, 
aggregation, and real entity theory. Only the last one, however, 
presupposes the existence of real corporate personhood of a 
narrative kind determined also internally; the other two either deny 
corporate personhood in the philosophical sense altogether, or 
suggest that “corporate personhood” is in fact individual 
personhood determined by membership in a certain collective. 
3. To what extent does the philosophical understanding of 
personhood and identity inform the debate about corporate (and 
group) rights and legal decision-making in that area, and is there an 
implicit recognition of corporate personhood when legislators or 
courts assert corporate rights? A philosophical conception of 
personhood (psychological or narrative) has no direct bearing upon 
the legal understanding of personhood—that is, whether a given 
entity is a “person” and has certain rights, privileges, and duties. 
Personhood understood legally is non-exclusively determined by a 
narrative of corporate identity; under the weak narratives (artificial 
entity and aggregation theories), corporations will have lesser rights 
than under the strong one (real entity theory). As for the “reverse 
engineering” of deducing personhood in its philosophical sense 
from its legal counterpart, it is a treacherous exercise: very often, 
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considering an entity as a “person” under the law is dictated not by 
recognition of that entity’s personhood in any real philosophical 
sense but by a legal fiction employed for the sake of social utility or 
formal administrability. 
4. Are there any rights at all that are properly attributable to a 
collective as a whole and not as an assemblage of individuals? 
Under the real entity narrative, yes (the other two identity theories 
are concerned with individual members of groups). 
5. If those rights exist, what is the source of those rights? If the real 
entity narrative controls, the source lies with group dignity—the 
respect for a collective will (separate from members’ individual 
wills) realizing group basic goods. Accordingly, group (or 
collective) rights are the entitlements necessary and sufficient to 
excel in those goods. Finally, some of these entitlements are shared 
between individuals and collectives, and some belong to only one 
side of this jurisprudential equation. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/6
